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HEALTH FINANCING AND FAMILY PLANNING IN
THE CONTEXT OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE:
CONNECTING THE DISCOURSE IN KENYA
INTRODUCTION
Financing is a major challenge and concern for the future of family planning (FP) programs. As countries commit to increasing access to and quality of FP services and to
universal health coverage (UHC), it is crucial that UHC schemes include FP and other
reproductive health (RH) services. Strategic purchasing of FP quality services from
public and private - including for profit and not-for-profit - healthcare providers could
accelerate progress toward UHC.

FIGURE 1. Health facility in Bungoma
County, Kenya

It is increasingly recognized that the FP2020 goals will not be met without adequate
attention to quality; and that a sustained focus on quality of care requires financing
at the policy and program levels. While the importance of financing is recognized
in relation to quality, the ‘how’ of financing FP within the context of UHC is not well
understood.
This brief targets the ‘bridge’ constituency that is coalescing between the health
financing and FP communities of practice around a shared interest in making access to health services universal. With this brief, we aim to highlight experiences in
Kenya, given that there is a body of experience with health financing reforms and UHC
schemes and a relatively strong national FP program. The Kenya case study is instructive for other countries with decentralized and mixed health systems as they seek to
integrate FP within their own UHC initiatives and health financing reforms.

METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE
The Kenya brief is the companion to the technical brief entitled ‘Health financing and
family planning in the context of Universal Health Care: connecting the discourse.’ It
has drawn upon on selected published and grey literature on health financing, FP and
UHC within in the Kenya context. The Kenya brief is presented using the 5P ‘organizing
framework’ in (Table 1) overleaf.
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POLITIES - WHY TO PURCHASE
The Government of Kenya (GoK) has expressed its political commitment to UHC and the
provision of quality health care for all. This is articulated in the Constitution of Kenya
(2010) and Kenya Vision 2030 long-term development goals. To enable Kenyans to
realize their constitutional right to health, the GoK has prioritized universal access to
primary health care (PHC) with attention to maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH)
services. An MNCH focus does not make explicit the societal and economic benefits of
FP nor is this politically championed. MNCH also competes with other priority interventions, such as non-communicable diseases (NCDs). PHC services, MNCH and FP
inclusive, are challenged by gaps in coverage of essential health services and quality
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TABLE 1. Strategic purchasing and FP
Purchasing domains

Purchasing elements

FP considerations

Polities: Why to purchase (rationale
and institutional arrangements)

•
•
•

•

•
•

Political commitment
Institutional arrangements
Purchaser alignment (across
mechanisms)
Monitoring and accountability
Performance management

•
•
•
•

People: For whom to purchase

•
•
•

Defined target clientele
Clientele awareness
Community and society
engagement

•
•
•
•

Package: What to purchase

•
•

Defined benefit objectives
Defined benefit package

•
•

Unmet need
Equity (e.g. poor women and
men, adolescents)
Client continued use (through
method choice)
Financial barriers/out-of-pocket
expenditure
Broad method mix to improve
choice, enable switching, and
reduce discontinuation
FP integration into RMNCAH
continuum/packages

Provider: From whom to purchase

•
•
•

Contracting
Accreditation
Integration (of public and
private providers)

•
•
•
•

Physical access/choice of outlet
Minimum quality standards
Integration of the private sector
Client realization of FP rights

Payment: How to purchase

•
•
•
•
•

Payment rates
Payment methods
Provider autonomy
Claims processing
Quality assurance (data and
clinical)

•

Likelihood of being offered
choice of FP method (e.g. provider behaviour)
Efficiency and quality
Regulatory and public financial
management

of care, with high provider absence from health facilities, low
adherence to clinical guidelines, and deficits in commodities
and infrastructure (World Bank, 2013).
Political commitment has not translated into adequate
domestic financing and is one reason for observed health
system impediments. The GoK spends about US$ 2.7 billion
on health care annually, or approximately $55 per capita, allocating about a third of the amount committed to under the
Abuja Declaration; this proportion has been decreasing over
time (GoK/MoH, 2016). About 63.3% of total health expenditure (THE) is funded publicly, including donor support and
health insurance (11% THE) while a further 36.7% is funded
privately, predominately through out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure at the point of service (GoK/MoH, 2012). Donor and private sector contributions have declined over time and remain
largely off-budget and issue-specific (GoK/MoH, 2012).
While the GoK is increasingly using the language of UHC,
there is a lack of alignment of health financing mecha-
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Societal benefits (FP rights,
gender equality)
Economic benefits
(demographic dividend)
Normative environment and
ability to realise rights for FP
Stewardship and ownership (e.g.
government and donors, central
and decentralized)
Fragmentation and adequacy of
financing (horizontal and
vertical coherence)

•
•

nisms. A health financing strategy has been drafted but has
yet to be endorsed (GoK/MoH, 2012). Financing is further
complicated by devolution, through which the 47 county governments control more than two thirds of health expenditure
(GoK/MoH, 2015). The National Hospital Insurance Fund
(NHIF), considered the main vehicle for UHC, covers about
20% of the population, mostly through mandatory enrollment
of the formal sector. Efforts are in place to expand coverage,
including the informal sector and indigent populations which
should see this proportion increase. The more recent UHC
pilot in four counties, which was intended to operate through
the NHIF, has by-passed this scheme, and will see user fees
removed writ large in the public sector. It is unclear what the
implications of this move mean to the NHIF or UHC plans
more broadly.
Health care purchasing arrangements are largely passive and not performance-based. At present, the GoK has
focused on input-based financing through pre-determined
annual budgets allocated through the Ministry of Finance.

FIGURE 2: Kenya’s FP s-curve
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Source: Avenir Health/Track20

Output-based financing is also done, mainly through the
NHIF. There is no definition of strategic purchasing provided
for within MoH policy documents, however the NHIF refers to
this as the ‘continuous search for the best ways to maximise
health system performance by deciding which interventions
should be purchased, how, and from whom’ based on the
Resilient and Responsive Health Systems (RESYST) definition
(RESYST, 2014).

PEOPLE: FOR WHOM TO PURCHASE
There has been uneven progress in reaching women with
FP services. While recent data indicate that Kenya has
achieved its FP2020 goal of 58% modern contraceptive
use by married women, progress has been starkly uneven
across the country: the modern contraceptive prevalence
rate (mCPR) remains as low as 2% among married women
in northeastern counties, compared to 76% in central counties — and the rate of contraceptive use among the poorest
is half that of the rest of the population (GoK/KNBS, 2014).
There is also very high unmet need within the 15-24-yearold cohort (48%) and in rural areas where women tend to
have sex earlier and use contraception later (IQVIA, 2018).
This suggests that both supply- and demand-side barriers
continue to limit access to FP, particularly for poor women,
men, and adolescents.
It is unclear the contribution of financial barriers to access
and equity constraints for the poor and other marginalised
populations. There is a lack of comprehensive data to
estimate OOP expenditure on RH, including FP (Sidze et al,
2013). While FP services are intended to be free within the

public health system, a study by Radovich et al (2017) indicated that only one-half of modern method users reported
obtaining their method at no cost. Monitoring by PMA2020
also estimated that 73.5% of women paid for FP services,
despite 60% of women receiving their service from a public
service delivery point, where FP is supposed to be free
at point of use. This suggests that FP OOP expenditure is
ubiquitous in Kenya.
There is increasing emphasis on differentiating population
segments so that FP subsidies can be targeted towards
those who need it. This is in recognition of limitations with
government domestic financing and over reliance on donor
financing (FP2020 Kenya, 2018). Donor and government
financing have largely focused on commodities, given
predicted financing gaps in the commodity pipeline, which
have been further complicated by devolution. In response,
a total market approach (TMA) has been proposed in order
to ‘differentiate population segments according to ability
to pay and identify which market players are best placed to
reach each segment’ (FP2020 Kenya).
This approach assumes an ability to segment the market
based on willingness to pay and may not consider the
intersectionality of gender with other social stratifiers. For
example, women already incur more OOP costs for health
than men and OOP expenditure may prevent more women
than men from utilizing essential services (Witter et al,
2017). While the global evidence on user fees as a barrier
to FP is inconclusive, poorer and/or younger populations
appear more price sensitive than the average population
(Korachais et al, 2016). In the Kenya context, given high
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FIGURE 3. NHIF benefit packages (national scheme)

levels of unmet need for FP and its co-location with more
marginalised and poorer populations, focusing on making
markets work for these segments is suggested. Figure 2
exemplifies this as counties with lower mCPR (those at the
bottom of the S-curve) are those with higher poverty rates,
lower literacy and economic empowerment and tend to be
concentrated at the ‘outer edges’ of the country, in the arid
and semi-arid lands of Kenya.

PACKAGE: WHAT TO PURCHASE
In the absence of a health financing strategy, benefit objectives and priority setting have not always been explicit or
transparent. The MoH defined benefit package of services,
the Kenya Essential Package of Health (KEPH), considered
more oriented to the public sector, has not guided the
development of NHIF packages (Tama et al, 2017). In lieu
of this, successive NHIF packages have been added (Figure
3), without broad consultation or consideration of equity
(Munge et al, 2017). These have increasingly catered to
NCDs given the burden of lifestyle diseases among higher
socio-economic groups, including those in formal employment, the primary members of the NHIF.
More recently (2018), a health benefits advisory panel was
established to define a UHC benefits package. It is unclear
what guiding principles were used by the panel, the majority
of whom were male and medical. Arrangements such as
these do not suggest explicit protection and careful linking
of benefits to needs of target populations, such as poor
women and adolescent girls. This may be due to the MoH’s
explicit attention to women in relation to their reproductive
roles, as mothers, through the provision of a free maternity
scheme, entitled Linda Mama. A secondary school student
4

package has also recently been introduced. This does not
include contraception but does allow students to be linked
to Linda Mama for free maternity care. Neither of these
schemes adequately address FP services and prevention of
pregnancy.
FP is included in the NHIF national scheme and Linda
Mama; however, this is not well understood by providers
or insurance members (or even by NHIF staff). Permanent
methods, tubal ligation and vasectomy, are included as
in-patient services paid on a fixed fee-for-service basis.
All other methods, including long-acting reversible contraception (LARC), are included in the out-patient scheme,
paid through capitation. Within the Linda Mama scheme,
post-partum FP is included as part of post-natal care (PNC)
but the reimbursement rate for each PNC visit is flat and
does not reflect the cost of offering this service. A Kenya
case study from the Africa Health Markets for Equity (AHME)
program noted that, in many instances, NHIF branch staff
and accredited providers were unclear on the inclusion of
FP, in terms of specific services and methods, as part of the
out-patient scheme (Appleford and Owino, 2017). This is
not without reason, as NHIF out-patient guidance is vague
(Figure 4). Guidance indicates the provision of natural,
hormonal, and permanent FP but does not specify which
methods, except for IUCD. This lack of clarity has implications for adoption of specific methods, method switching
and continuation.

PROVIDER: FROM WHOM TO PURCHASE
Kenya has a mixed health system, comprised of public and
private providers, that is largely pro-PHC (Figure 5). This is
comprised of an estimated 8,400 health facilities distributed

FIGURE 4. FP guidance within NHIF documentation
Family planning
•
•
•
•
•

Consultation with a clinician
Health education on natural and artificial family planning
methods
Assessment for appropriateness of particular
methods (Natural, Hormonal, and IUDs)
Initiation/administration of a particular FP method
Change of a family planning method

Radiology Services – Basic x-rays are covered under the
general outpatient and inpatient care while MRI and CT scans
are available in select facilities under a referral system with a
pre-authorization from NHIF
Inpatient Services – Including accommodation/bed charges,
nursing care, consultation, prescribed drugs/medication,
laboratory services, surgery, physiotherapy, specialist
consultation and treatment
Maternity Services – including prenatal care, child delivery
- normal and caesarean section, postnatal care, Manual
Vacuum Aspiration (MVA) and family planning services
Kidney Care package – including Renal Dialysis through
inpatient or outpatient for a maximum of two sessions in a
week, Kidney transplants at approved facilities
Drug and Rehabilitation services – at accredited rehabilitation
centers at maximum of one treatment session in a year.

across the country. Forty-nine percent of health facilities
are private, comprised of commercial for-profit providers
(33%) and not-for-profit providers (16%) (GoK/MoH, 2014).
The private sector provides over 40% of services, mainly
curative, and plays a key role in extending services to hardto-reach areas and populations. Despite this, coverage of
both public and private health facilities remains uneven –
at its extremes, There is a concentration of health facilities
in Nairobi county as it is the seat of the capital city and a
large urban area; on the other hand, rural areas such as
Isiolo county are underserved with fewer facilities. Physical
access therefore remains a challenge for many Kenyans,
and has a bearing on rights to realise fertility intentions
through FP.
The composition and mix of public and private providers
allow for a range of purchasing options at national and
county level. These arrangements include:

•

The Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA) purchases contraceptive commodities, that are then warehoused and distributed to county stores. These are

paid for through ear-marked sources of financing (via
donors and the national government), given that most
counties have not purchased FP commodities through
their own revenue sources. Public facilities are given
priority for commodities, however private facilities may
also access these, when available, if they are registered with a Master Facility List number and provide
monthly service reports using MoH registers.

•

National and county governments (47 in total) purchase
healthcare services from public health facilities, which
they own. This includes three tertiary care hospitals
(national level) and primary and secondary public
health facilities (county level). Services are paid for
through line-item budgets, the majority of which goes
to personal emoluments leaving little available for programs, such as RH/FP.

•

The NHIF purchases services from public and private
health facilities on behalf of registered NHIF members.
These are defined in various service packages, ranging
from the most basic (SupaCover) to more compre5

FIGURE 5. Health facility composition

35% private
clinics and
nursing homes
46% public and
private
dispensaries
13% public
health
centres

7%
hospitals
(GoK and
private)

hensive packages (e.g. civil servants and corporate
schemes). The in-patient package includes surgical
FP procedures while the out-patient package includes
long- and short-acting methods of FP.

•

The NHIF purchases services from public and private
health facilities under Linda Mama as part of its managed schemes and sponsored programs. The maternity
service scheme was formerly managed as a fee exempt
service package by the MoH, whereby public health
facilities were reimbursed for foregone user fees at
agreed reimbursement rates. The Linda Mama scheme
has extended this to private facilities and, in theory, includes post-partum FP (counseling, commodity, service
and any after care requirements).

•

Results-based purchasing, which entails financing
from donors (e.g. World Bank and the Global Financing
Facility), channeled through the Ministry of Finance to
purchase services at county level. While purchasing
mainly targets public providers, counties may also purchase services from the private sector should they wish
to do so. FP is one of six results-based performance
indicators.

•

Bespoke county UHC schemes intended to purchase
PHC services for indigent populations. Often this is in
the form of removal of user fees at public hospitals
(given that primary levels are, in principle, free). These
schemes have been initiated at the request of county
governors and are often politically motivated.

The range of purchasing points necessitate coherence between national and county level. In some instances, this is
demonstrated; for example, results-based purchasing is ini-
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tiated at national level and executed at county level and is
coordinated through annual workplans implemented mainly
through the public sector. In other instances, this is not
demonstrated. For example, commodity procurement, initiated and financed by counties, is used to procure commodities from KEMSA. However, counties have not prioritized - or
resourced - FP to the level previously done by the national
MoH before devolution. As noted, ‘the Kenya government
provided 40% of FP commodities in 2013, dropping to 2.9%
in 2015 due to changes related to the decentralization of
the health budget. Based on lessons learnt, there is now
near consensus that, procurement of FP commodities
should not have been devolved’ (GoK/MoH, 2017).
The mix of public and private providers also necessitate an
integrated or whole sector approach to health service
delivery. However, county departments of health, the stewards of PHC, may view the private sector more as ‘foe’ than
‘friend’. This is reflective of an emergent political economy
in Kenya where the private sector is being presented in
government and the media as ‘profit driven’. This viewpoint
appears to emanate from capture of the NHIF market by the
private sector, when the public sector was in a particularly
weakened state during sequential industrial action by doctors and nurses in 2017. This portrayal of the private sector
has been writ large and may extend to health facilities
operating in Kenya’s rural counties. In these contexts, some
private providers, particularly smaller, female run clinics
and nursing homes, report being discriminated against by
the NHIF, through such tactics as delayed or frustrated NHIF
and Linda Mama accreditation and processing of reimbursement claims (Appleford, forthcoming). Active participation of the private sector in purchasing arrangements, such
as the NHIF and Linda Mama, has implications for client
choice, particularly where physical access and FP availability and quality in the public sector may be constrained.

PAYMENT: HOW TO PURCHASE
While Kenya’s health sector has articulated long-term
policies, these do not explicitly address how to purchase.
Within the Kenya Health Policy (2014-2030), and a five-year
strategic plan, the Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan, this
is implied more than stated, through emphasis on health
systems efficiency and quality (Tama et al, 2017). The MoH
defined benefit package, the Kenya Essential Package for
Health (KEPH), is also silent on strategic purchasing.
In practice, purchasing mechanisms (outlined under
provider) tend to operate in isolation with implications for
efficiency and quality. While greater decision making over
domestic resources was intended to reap a ‘devolution
dividend’, this has not been optimized due to weak coor-

dination between national and county levels (GoK/MoH,
2016). This is most clearly exemplified by the commodity
disconnect between counties and KEMSA. Within county
health systems, devolution has also been accompanied by
a perceived trend toward reduced autonomy among public
health facilities (Barasa et al, 2017). This trend, termed
‘recentralization within decentralization’ (Barasa et al,
2017) has in effect countered the objectives of devolution
through, inter alia, reduced responsiveness and local
accountability in many of Kenya’s counties. In the case of
FP, this has created a situation of erratic FP commodity
availability and depressed quality and choice within the
public sector.
Choice of payment method may also depress the provision of FP under the NHIF. Within the NHIF outpatient
scheme, capitation was selected as the preferred means
of provider payment ‘to induce positive incentives in the
health delivery system’ (GoK, 2012). However, this may
not be the case for FP. While capitation is a cost containment strategy, some FP services, such as LARC, are less
likely to be offered by providers as there is no additional
reimbursement for such services. Instead, capitation is
likely to induce providers to offer cheaper, easier to administer methods, over LARC methods that require more
time, skills and consumables. This, in effect, may reduce
contraceptive choice and result in continued OOP expenditure for women covered under the NHIF.
A similar situation also exists for post-partum FP under
the Linda Mama scheme. A case study from Bungoma
county found that none of the providers interviewed as
part of the study were aware that post-partum FP was included as part of the PNC package as the reimbursement
rate for each PNC visit is flat and low (KES 250 or US
$2.50 per visit) and does not come with an additional reimbursement or guarantee of free commodities (Appleford
and Mbuthia, 2018). The effective inclusion of modern
post-partum FP in Linda Mama would allow Kenya a viable strategy for improving its uptake, which is estimated
at only 16% at six months, despite an estimated 64% of
women delivering in health facilities (Avenir Health, 2017).
This is a missed opportunity for post-partum women under Linda Mama, many of whom are rural and poor.

CONCLUSION
FP uptake in Kenya has grown significantly but county
disparities and population inequities remain. Devolution,
while intended to address health system performance
and accountability, has contributed to a situation of FP
commodity insecurity, with implications for equity and
access. While more can be done within the envelope of

available health financing mechanisms, there is need for
sustained and additional resources to meet current demands for FP and address unmet and latent need across
counties represented on Kenya’s S-curve.
Transition away from donor to domestic financing is not
clearly articulated or well stewarded within the Kenya context. This is compounded by an array of sources of financing
and purchasing points. The capacity of the national and
county level to steward the public and private sectors and
create the conditions for active purchasing from both is
required. This includes autonomous decision making over
financial resources within public health facilities as well as
the inclusion and active participation of private providers in
UHC schemes. Within these schemes, how FP services are
compensated should balance incentives for efficiency with
incentives for appropriate provision using the rights-based
approach to user-centric care so that risks of sub-optimal
outcomes are mitigated. The five P framework serves to
highlight disconnects but also opportunities that could
guide greater alignment across purchasing mechanisms.
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